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39 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT 
RESTRICTIONS IN STATE FILM INCENTIVE 
PROGRAMS 
 
Dr. Joel Timmer 
 
In recent years, many states have offered incentive programs to 
lure film production and its associated economic benefits—increased 
jobs, spending, and tourism—to their states.  Several of these programs 
have restrictions that deny incentives based on a film’s content.  For 
example, Texas denies film incentives to projects that have 
“inappropriate content” or portray “Texas or Texans in a negative way.”  
This article concludes that these restrictions do not violate the First 
Amendment.  Two key considerations factor into this conclusion:  First, 
in granting subsidies, the government may apply criteria that would be 
impermissible in a regulatory context.  Second, the denial of a subsidy 
is not the same as the infringement of a right. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Film production yields many economic benefits, including 
increased jobs and tourism.  It should come as no surprise, therefore, 
that many states have created incentive programs to lure film production 
to their state.  These programs, however, often come with restrictions, 
such as what type of content may make a film ineligible.  For example, 
Texas may deny support from its incentive programs to projects that 
have “inappropriate content” or portray “Texas or Texans in a negative 
way.”1 
This article addresses the question of whether the denial of film 
incentives based on a film’s content violates a filmmaker’s First 
Amendment free-speech right; it concludes it does not.  Part II 
introduces the Machete controversy and the Texas film incentive 
program.  Part III provides an overview of film incentive programs’ 
inception and the benefits they provide states.  Part IV examines the 
Texas film incentive program’s operation and standards—arguably 
some of the most restrictive state film incentive program standards in 
the nation.2  Part V provides a brief overview of First Amendment 
protections for film.  Part VI examines the public forum doctrine and its 
applicability to state film incentive program restrictions, while Part VII 
examines the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its applicability 
here.  Part VIII builds on Parts VI and VII, analyzing the First 
Amendment principles applicable to government subsidies like film 
incentives.  Part IX examines two cases in which denials of government 
funding for art—based on government objections to the art—were 
found to violate the First Amendment.  Part X then returns to the 
Machete controversy, delving more deeply into the court’s decision in 
Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. and a similar case involving the Machete 
sequel, Machete Kills.  Finally, Part XI concludes that state film 
incentive provisions that allow film content to be a consideration for 
subsidy grants, are unlikely to violate the First Amendment.  
 
                                                           
1. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e) (West 2017). 
2. See Brice Wallace, The Screening Process:  A Form of Censorship or a Way to 
Safeguard Taxpayer Money?, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 16, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseret 
news.com/article/705263109/The-screening-process-A-form-of-censorship-or-a-way-to-safeguard 
-taxpayer-money.html? [http://perma.cc/6V7F-SG27]. 
TIMMER  3/22/2018  8:01 PM 
2018] THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT RESTRICTIONS 41 
II. The Machete Controversy And  
The Texas State Film Incentive Program 
 
Beginning as nothing more than a fake trailer, the film Machete, 
and its sequel, Machete Kills, stirred up controversy over the use of 
Texas’ film incentive funds to support projects that portray the state in a 
negative light.3  This controversy resulted in two court cases 
challenging a state’s ability to deny financial incentives for a film based 
on its content.  The basis for the controversy is best illustrated by the 
following quote from a character—Texas State Senator McLaughlin—
in the 2010 Machete film, speaking at a rally about immigrants:  
The aliens, the infiltrators, the outsiders, they come right across by 
light of day or dark of night.  They’ll bleed us, they’re parasites.  
They’ll bleed us until we as a city, a county, a state, a nation are all 
bled out.  Make no mistake:  we are at war.  Every time an illegal 
dances across our border it is an act of aggression against this 
sovereign state, an overt act of terrorism.4 
The fake Machete trailer originally appeared in the 2007 double 
feature Grindhouse,5 consisting of the films “Planet Terror, written and 
directed by [Robert] Rodriguez, and Death Proof, written and directed 
by [Quentin] Tarantino.”6  Fake film-trailers and commercials 
accompany the double feature, all meant to simulate and “heighten the 
experience of exploitation double features of decades past.”7  The 
                                                           
3. Reeve Hamilton, Robert Rodriguez Film at Issue in Incentive Debate, TEXAS TRIBUNE 
(Sept. 3, 2010, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2010/09/03/robert-rodriguez-film-at-
issue-in-incentive-debate/ [http://perma.cc/3E5U-MDD2]. 
4. Machete (2010)—Plot Summary, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0985694/synopsis 
[http://perma.cc/J5WF-ERA7]. 
5. Nikki Finke, Fox Wins Studio War for Robert Rodriguez’ ‘Machete’; Now His New 
Filmmaking Home, DEADLINE (Jan. 24, 2010, 1:58 PM), http://deadline.com/2010/01/fox-wins-
studio-war-for-robert-rodriguez-machete-and-will-be-his-new-filmmaking-home-23299/ 
[http://perma.cc/VZ4H-BL7Q]. 
6. Henriette Maria Aschenbrenner, Two of a Kind—Robert Rodriguez’s and Quentin 
Tarantino’s Culturally Intertextual Comment on Film History:  The Grindhouse Project, 33 POST 
SCRIPT 42, 43 (2014). 
7. Id. 
TIMMER  3/22/2018  8:01 PM 
42 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
Machete trailer, directed by Rodriguez, kicks off the double feature.  
The trailer’s protagonist, Machete, is a “Mexican day laborer [who] is 
set up, double-crossed, and left for dead—then starts everyone’s worst 
nightmare.”8  Considered by some to be “the single best thing about” 
Grindhouse, the trailer went on to rack up 1.4 million YouTube views 
within a couple of years.9  The trailer also ended up spawning two 
actual films,10 as well as controversy over the Texas film incentive 
program’s support for the film.11  
Rodriguez based the trailer and films’ concept on the story of a 
Mexican national police officer (a Federale) “who gets hired to do 
hatchet jobs in the U.S.”12  Seeking to create a “‘70s-style B-movie’”13 
with a Mexican action hero in Charles Bronson or Jean-Claude Van 
Damme’s vein,14 Rodriguez packed the Machete trailer and films with 
“a relentless onslaught of over-the-top violence, extreme gore, 
gratuitous nudity and cheap laughs.”15  It is an “example of the genre 
cheekily labeled ‘Mexploitation’”16 and “a relentless series of action set 
pieces in which Machete dispatches his opponents using any and all 
                                                           
8. Finke, supra note 5; see also Machete (2010)—Plot Summary, supra note 4.  
9. Finke, supra note 5. 
10. Aschenbrenner, supra note 6 at 43 (explaining that “[t]he films were both shot back to 
back and were to be shown in one session with the intention to recreate a complete cultural setting 
in reminiscence of 1960s–1980s movie theaters in which the audience could watch double 
features of various B-movies”). 
11. Hamilton, supra note 3. 
12. Gavin Edwards, Online Exclusive:  Horror Film Directors Dish about Grindhouse 
Trailers, ROLLING STONE (April 19, 2007, 11:49 AM), http://archive.li/4kZTI [https://perma. 
cc/89HH-PVVQ]. 
13. Frank Sheck, Machete:  Film Review, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 14, 2007, 10:04 
PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/review/machete-film-review-29917 [http://perma.cc/ 
Y73Z-BPD9]. 
14. Peter Sciretta, Grindhouse:  Rodriguez to Turn They Call Him Machete into Feature 
Length Movie, /FILM (March 12, 2007), http://www.slashfilm.com/grindhouse-rodriguez-to-turn-
they-call-him-machete-into-feature-length-movie/ [http://perma.cc/NP5C-BCMP]. 
15. Sheck, supra note 13. 
16. Id. 
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sharp objects available, from surgical instruments to the fearsome titular 
blade.”17  
With plans to shoot the first Machete film in Texas, the film’s 
production company, Machete Chop Shop (“Chop Shop”), applied for a 
grant to help finance the film’s production under Texas’ Film Incentive 
Program.18  The Texas Film Commission granted Chop Shop 
preliminary approval for a grant for Machete.19   
Prior to the release of Grindhouse, and in response to recent 
developments, Rodriguez recut the Machete trailer to take aim at 
Arizona and its newly-enacted anti-immigration law.20  The trailer 
featured an introduction by the title character saying, “‘This is Machete 
with a special Cinco de Mayo message . . . to Arizona.’  Mayhem, 
including shots of angry illegal immigrants rising up in rebellion, 
followed.”21  In response to the recut trailer, conservative radio talk 
show host and accused “conspiracy theorist,” Alex Jones began a 
campaign against the film.22  Jones asserted that Machete was likely “to 
trigger racial riots and racial killings in the United States,”23 and he 
                                                           
17. Id. 
18. Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2015). 
19. Id.  Specifically, the commission notified Chop Shop that an initial review concluded 
that the film fulfilled the Incentive Program’s content requirement, but that this assessment 
“‘pertain[ed] only to the qualification of the application’ and that ‘[i]f the final content is 
determined to be in violation of the rules and regulations of the incentive program, the project 
[would] not be eligible to receive funds’ from the Program.”  Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. v. Tex. 
Film Comm’n, 483 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (alteration in original). 
20. That law was SB 1070, which made “it a crime for immigrants not to carry their 
documents.”  Jay A. Fernandez & Borys Kit, How “Machete” Inflames Immigration Debate, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Aug. 26, 2010, 10:40 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/ 
how-machete-inflames-immigration-debate-27149 [http://perma.cc/E3GU-48MM]; Soraya Roberts, 
Robert Rodriguez Cuts ‘Illegal’ Trailer for ‘Machete’ to Protest Arizona Immigration Law, 
DAILY NEWS (May 6, 2010, 10:39 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv-
movies/robert-rodriguez-cuts-illegal-trailer-machete-protest-arizona-immigration-law-article-1.19 
0695 [https://perma.cc/C3S6-4FXY]. 
21. Fernandez & Kit, supra note 20. 
22. Richard Whittaker, Is that a Wrap for Incentives?, AUSTIN CHRONICLE (Jan. 28, 
2011), https://www.austinchronicle.com/screens/2011-01-28/is-that-a-wrap-for-incentives 
[https://perma.cc/3D4B-5RQP]. 
23. Hamilton, supra note 3. 
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denounced the film as the “equivalent of a Hispanic Birth of a Nation” 
for inciting “racial jihad.”24  When it came to light that the commission 
had given preliminary approval to the film’s grant application, and that 
it had assisted filmmakers with location access,25 Jones also began a 
campaign to eliminate state funding for the film.26  This resulted in “a 
wave of letters to the Governor’s Office and the Texas Film 
Commission, savaging [Machete] as a call to a race war.”27  
In the film, Danny Trejo plays “Machete,” the Federale named “for 
his deadly skill” with the device.28  Towards the beginning of the film, 
Machete defies his superior’s direct order and attempts to free a 
kidnapping victim from a drug lord, only to learn that the drug lord is 
working with his superior.29  Disappointed that Machete will not take 
bribe money to look the other way, his superior has Machete’s wife 
killed in front of him and informs Machete that his daughter has 
suffered a similar fate.30  Machete is left to die,31 but he survives, ending 
up as a day laborer and vigilante in Texas.32  There, a businessman hires 
                                                           
24. Id. 
25. Racist Film ‘Machete’ Produced with Taxpayer Funds, INFOWARS (May 14, 2010), 
https://www.infowars.com/racist-film-machete-produced-with-taxpayer-funds [https://perma.cc/43 52-FLWX]. 
26. Whittaker, supra note 22. 
27. Id. (explaining that “[o]ver the course of six months, the film commission received 
around 500 letters”); see Alexander Zaitchik, Does Robert Rodriguez’s ‘Machete’ Evoke ‘Race 
War’?, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Sept. 10, 2010), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2010/09/ 
10/does-robert-rodriguez%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98machete%E2%80%99-advocate-%E2%80% 
98race-war%E2%80%99 [http://perma.cc/6GD4-FWVH]. 
28. Action Comedy ‘Machete’ Explores Illegal Immigration Controversy, VOA (Sept. 6, 
2010, 8:00 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/action-comedy-machete-explores-illegal-
immigration-controversy-102338284/164770.html [https://perma.cc/9F65-J6SS]; Nicole Kinsley, 
Texas Film Commission Permitted to Slice and Dice Financial Incentives to Machete Films, 
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, (Feb. 29, 2016) http://www.trademarkandcopyright 
lawblog.com/2016/02/texas-film-commission-permitted-to-slice-and-dice-financial-incentives-to-
machete-films/ [http://perma.cc/6Q3M-485B]. 
29. Machete (2010)—Plot Summary, supra note 4. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See id.  
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him to assassinate a Texas senator using inflammatory rhetoric while 
campaigning against illegal immigrants.33  Before carrying out the plot, 
Machete learns he has been double-crossed and is shot and wounded by 
one of the businessman’s aides.34  The assassination turns out to be a 
ploy by the businessman and senator who are working together;35 their 
goal is to use Machete’s failed assassination attempt to stir “anti-
immigrant sympathies among Texas voters.”36  Here is where the film’s 
tagline—”They just fucked with the wrong Mexican”37—comes into 
play.  Seeking revenge, Machete “initiates an out-and-out killing spree, 
recruiting an angry mob along the way, whose leader decries ‘We didn’t 
cross the border, the border crossed us’ in downtown Austin.”38  With 
the assistance of “an army of illegal immigrants” he has gathered, 
Machete seeks revenge against the men who double-crossed him.39  
Ultimately, Machete becomes a hero for oppressed immigrants.40   
Alex Jones, in criticizing the film’s potential to incite “violence” 
and “riots,” describes its ending this way: 
By the end, the vicious revenge killer [Machete] is cast in the holy 
light of a martyr; his likeness is placed on religious candles as the 
Virgin Mary or Jesus Christ would be.  Vulnerable illegal 
immigrants, seeking to evade crude Militia Men characters as they 
cross the border, pray to Machete for protection, in the hopes [that] 
he will wipe out their enemies.  Machete becomes a folk hero of 
                                                           
33. Alex Jones and Aaron Dykes, New Film ‘Machete’ Evokes Race War, INFOWARS 
(May 9, 2010), https://www.infowars.com/new-film-machete-to-provoke-race-war/ [http://perma. 
cc/9TA9-ZYDZ]; Sheck, supra note 13. 
34. Bruce Watson, ‘Machete’ Trailer Takes a Smart Slash at Arizona’s Immigration Law, 
AOL (May 8, 2010, 10:00 AM), https://www.aol.com/2010/05/08/machete-movie-trailer-smart-
slash-arizona-immigration-law/ [http://perma.cc/6BU2-ME96]. 
35. Hamilton, supra note 3. 
36. Id.  
37. See Finke, supra note 5. 
38. Jones & Dykes, New Film ‘Machete’ Evokes Race War, supra note 33. 
39. Watson, supra note 34. 
40. See Machete (2010)—Plot Summary, supra note 4. 
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sorts, like a Father Hidalgo figure,41 and his iconography carries 
over into the traditional use of the machete as a symbol of peasant 
uprisings.42 
Following the political controversy, the commission departed from 
its favorable preliminary determination and instead “denied Chop 
Shop’s application for a grant due to ‘inappropriate content or content 
that portrays Texas or Texans in a negative fashion.’”43  Yet, there had 
been no significant changes to the script from the time of the 
commission’s preliminary approval to the film’s completion.44  Chop 
Shop therefore filed suit, alleging a violation of its Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights and contesting the commission’s 
authority.45  The case, Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. v. Texas Film 
Commission, raised the question of whether a state may deny a 
filmmaker incentives because the state objects to the content of a 
filmmaker’s production.46  After all, the Supreme Court has stated that, 
“the government offends the First Amendment when it imposes 
financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content of their 
expression.”47 
                                                           
41. Father Hidalgo was a leader of the Mexican War of Independence.  See Miguel 
Hidalgo y Costilla, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel_Hidalgo_y_Costilla 
[http://perma.cc/3MKL-5DPN]. 
42. Alex Jones & Aaron Dykes, Leaked ‘Machete’ Script Confirms Race War Plot, 
INFOWARS (May 13, 2010), https://www.infowars.com/leaked-machete-script-confirms-race-war-
plot/ [http://perma.cc/YFD9-TR5Z] (emphasis omitted). 
43. Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015). 
44. Kinsley, supra note 28. 
45. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., 483 S.W.3d at 277.  
46. See id. 
47. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (citing 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991)). 
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III. STATE FILM INCENTIVE PROGRAMS 
A. The Inception of Film Incentive Programs 
In 1992, Louisiana became “the first state to adopt state tax 
incentives for film and television production.”48  Once Louisiana’s 
program proved successful in encouraging strong film and television 
production growth within the state, other states responded by offering 
their own incentives.49  As a result, “[b]y 2009, 44 U.S. states, Puerto 
Rico, and Washington D.C. offered some form of film and television 
production incentives.”50  The basic theory behind these incentive 
programs is that states themselves benefit economically from bringing 
production to their locales.51  Specifically, “film production[s] . . . create 
new jobs and boost sales at area businesses, as companies rush to fill 
positions, purchase equipment and acquire other resources to keep 
filming on schedule.  Benefits . . . then spread, as spillover effects of the 
initial ‘shock’ multiply through the local economy.”52 
B. State Subsidies 
According to the Council of State Governments, the most common 
types of state film and television production subsidies are:    
     
• “Tax credits [which] reduce income tax liability.  To 
qualify, companies must generally commit to some 
minimum amount of in-state production expenditures.  The 
credit is usually offered as a percentage of these dollars.”53 
                                                           
48. State Film Production Incentives and Programs, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (June 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-film-production-
incentives-and-programs.aspx [https://perma.cc/AW8W-UVCV]. 
49. Id.; see, e.g., Bryn Elise Sandberg, Film and TV Tax Incentives:  A State-by-State 
Guide, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 21, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter. 
com/news/film-tv-tax-incentives-a-885699 [https://perma.cc/AW8W-UVCV]. 
50. State Film Production Incentives and Programs, supra note 48. 
51. Zach Huitink, An Update on State Film Industry Incentives, THE COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOV’TS (June 15, 2011, 12:02 PM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/update-state-film-
industry-incentives [https://perma.cc/K5R8-H9V6]. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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• “Cash rebates . . . for qualified production expenses.”54 
• Cash grants, “generally awarded to offset either a) a 
percentage of the dollar value of qualified production 
expenditures, or b) all the associated sales and use tax.”55 
• Other assistance, including “lodging exemptions, free 
access to filming locations, and low-cost use of 
government services (such as police officers to direct 
traffic around an outdoor set).”56 
Because these incentive programs can help film-producers save 
significantly on production costs, they are highly appealing.57 
C. Benefits to the State 
States can benefit in at least four ways from attracting production 
to their locales.58  The first benefit is the attraction of “out-of-state 
investment” to the state.  Film production requires filmmakers to 
purchase “many goods and services, such as hardware, lumber, catering, 
and security, which are provided by state vendors and suppliers.”59  
Additionally, production personnel may also boost economic activity in 
a locale by spending money on lodging, dining, and entertainment.  In 
turn, the state collects taxes on all of these expenditures.60  The second 
benefit is the creation of jobs for state residents.  “The majority of film 
production work is performed by a wide array of employees such as 
technicians, truck drivers, caterers, construction crews, architects, and 
attorneys.  70 to 80 percent of those film production workers are hired 
locally.”61  The third benefit is the stimulation of “film-related state 
                                                           
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Scott Ahmad, Can the First Amendment Stop Content Restriction in State Film 
Incentive Programs?, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 395, 403 (2009). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id.(citations omitted). 
61. Id.(citations omitted). 
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tourism,”—tourists traveling to visit locations featured in a film.62  The 
fourth benefit is that filmmakers may “invest significant resources to 
develop communities in order to create the right look for a film.  In that 
process, they make many improvements, including building repair, road 
pavement, and garden planting.  The improvements remain long after 
the filming ends.”63  
A study on the impact of the Texas Incentive Program found the 
following benefits for the State of Texas:  
Based on the $58.1 million paid and encumbered as of December 
31, 2010, total economic benefits from the moving image industry 
incentive program were approximately $1.1 billion in direct, 
indirect, and induced economic activity in Texas from 2007 
through 2010.  This can be interpreted another way:  for every 
dollar of the $58.1 million the Texas Film Commission had paid or 
encumbered as of December 31, 2010, $18.72 in private sector 
economic activity had been generated within the State of Texas.64 
Numbers provided by the State of Texas seem to confirm the 
incentive program’s benefits:  
[T]he [Texas] comptroller’s office reported that in 2005, before the 
incentives took effect, there were 51 film and TV projects in Texas, 
spending a total of $155 million.  By 2009 [after the incentives took 
effect in 2007],65 there were 244 projects worth $249.7 million.66  
                                                           
62. Id. at 403–04 (citations omitted) (observing that, for example, “65,000 tourists a year 
visit the cornfield in Iowa where the 1989 movie Field of Dreams was set”). 
63. Id. at 404 (citations omitted) (observing that, for example, “[a]ccording to the 
National Governors Association, the film industry has been the key to economic recovery in 
Louisiana after the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005”). 
64. James E. Jarrett & Bruce Kellison, Texas Moving Image Industry Incentive Program:  
The Economic Benefits from Incentives, (April 2011), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/2152/14734/bbr-2011-texas-film-incentives.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/ 
C9BT-326V]. 
65. History | Texas Film Commission, TEX. FILM COMM’N, https://gov.texas.gov/film/ 
page/history [https://perma.cc/PJF4-F72P]. 
66. Richard Whittaker, Is that a Wrap for Incentives?, AUSTIN CHRONICLE (Jan. 28, 2011), 
https://www.austinchronicle.com/screens/2011-01-28/is-that-a-wrap-for-incentives [https://perma.cc/ 
3D4B-5RQP]. 
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In total, projects approved for incentives created 27,057 jobs, 
including 3,790 full-time positions.67  
The comptroller’s report went on to estimate “that eligible projects 
have brought $600 million in economic activity to Texas.”68 
While several studies have found incentive programs beneficial, 
others have reached a contrary conclusion.  Some studies have found 
that incentive programs do not provide meaningful economic benefits to 
states that offer them.69  For example, critics argue that subsidies and 
credits cost states and “reward producers for projects they might have 
undertaken anyway.”70 Many production-related jobs “are temporary 
and part-time,” and non-residents often fill a large portion of them—
especially the highest-paid jobs.71  Critics also suggest that “[f]ilm 
subsidies don’t pay for themselves, so state taxpayers bear the 
burden.”72  Competition among states to attract productions may also 
force states to “give movie-makers generous subsidies indefinitely in 
order to ‘stay in the game.’”73  
The popularity of state incentive programs is in decline.  By 
“2016, only 37 states . . . maintain[ed] film incentive programs 
[compared to 44 in 2009], and several of [those] states . . . tighten[ed] 
the requirements for qualifying expenses and reel[ed]-in per-project and 
annual program caps.”74  Studies suggest these incentive programs’ 
                                                           
67. Id.  
68. Id. 
69. See, e.g., Michael Thom, Lights, Camera, but No Action? Tax and Economic 
Development Lessons from State Motion Picture Incentive Programs, THE AM. REVIEW OF PUB. 
ADMIN. (June 5, 2016), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0275074016651958 
[https://perma.cc/BWK7-96ZH]; Robert Tannenwald, State Film Subsidies:  Not Much Bang for 
too Many Bucks, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-
film-subsidies-not-much-bang-for-too-many-bucks?fa=view&id=3326 [http://perma.cc/S2VY-4V 
ZD]. 
70. Tannenwald, supra note 69. 
71.  Id.  
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  State Film Production Incentives and Programs, supra note 48. 
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decline is due to their costliness, inability to induce overall economic 
growth, and “failure to raise tax revenue.”75    
In addition to fiscal concerns, Texas policymakers have also 
expressed content concerns about some of the films receiving state 
support.76  Machete, discussed infra in more depth, is not the only film 
to have drawn such concern.  Glory Road, a Texas-filmed 2006 sports 
drama tells “the inspirational tale of the [1966] Texas Western Miners, 
the first all-black college basketball team to win a national 
championship.”77  The film raised concern among Texas legislators and 
led to content-based considerations being added to the Texas Incentive 
Program.78 
Although Glory Road is based on actual events, the filmmakers 
took poetic license in portraying the story.79  A scene depicting “a 
racially charged incident” during a college basketball game caused the 
most concern.80  Portrayed “as a factual event,” the scene shows a white 
Texas A&M (Aggies) team “thr[owing] epitaphs disparaging” the 
opponent team’s black players.81  The scene also depicts the “Aggie 
fans as racist.”82  Texas A&M, having not been involved in the actual 
                                                           
75. William Luther, Movie Production Incentives:  Blockbuster Support for Lackluster 
Policy, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 2010), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/sr173.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/936X-VP4B]. 
76. Charles Ealy & Chris Garcia, ‘Waco’ Gets the Red Light from Texas Film 
Commission, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (May 25, 2009), http://www.culteducation.com/group/ 
1220-waco-davidians/24339-waco-gets-the-red-light-from-texas-film-commission.html [http://perma. 
cc/49GR-W7SL]. 
77. Hilary Hylton, Filming Texas in a Good Light, TIME (July 2, 2007), 
http://content.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1639352,00.html [https://perma.cc/XW9M-7HWU]; 
Ealy & Garcia, supra note 76. 
78. Id.  
79. Katy Vine, This Film Is Not Yet Rated, TEX. MONTHLY (July 2009), 
http://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/this-film-is-not-yet-rated/ [http://perma.cc/9LY5-RWLF]. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Ealy & Garcia, supra note 76; Hylton, supra note 77.  
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incident, took offense and objected to being “disparaged” in this 
manner.83  
It was around the time of the Glory Road controversy that the 
Texas Legislature began considering the creation of a state film 
incentive program.84  Initially, the proposal for the program “had no 
content provision, except for [a prohibition on state funding of] 
pornography.”85  Following the Glory Road controversy, State Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman Steve Ogden (R-Bryan)—”whose district 
includes Texas A&M University”—added a provision to the bill 
preventing incentives from being granted to films depicting Texas or 
Texans in a negative light.86 
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) opposed the 
provision on First Amendment grounds and urged Texas Governor Rick 
Perry to veto the bill, stating: 
This provision is a direct indictment of the creative process and 
American values of free expression that are fundamental to our 
democracy. . . .  Motion pictures made in the United States are the 
most popular form of entertainment worldwide because filmmakers 
are free to tell stories on film without fear of government 
censorship.  Such restrictions . . . burden protected speech and 
constitute prior restraint and government intervention, which the 
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled many times is impermissible.87 
Nevertheless, the provision became law.88 
Texas is not the only state to consider the content of film and 
television projects seeking state funding.89  In Wisconsin, productions 
                                                           
83. Vine, supra note 79. 
84. Id.  
85. Id.  
86. Hylton, supra note 77; see also Ealy & Garcia, supra note 76. 
87. Brice Wallace, The Screening Process:  A Form of Censorship or a Way to Safeguard 
Taxpayer Money?, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 16, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/ 
article/705263109/The-screening-process-A-form-of-censorship-or-a-way-to-safeguard-taxpayer-
money.html [http://perma.cc/6V7F-SG27] (quotation omitted). 
88. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e) (West 2017). 
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do not qualify for incentives if they “will hurt the reputation of the 
state.”90  Similarly, a production that “portrays West Virginia in a 
‘significantly derogatory manner’ is ineligible for West Virginia film 
credits.”91  Pennsylvania and Kentucky only provide support for 
productions that positively affect state tourism.92  Other states impose 
similar restrictions.93 
IV. THE TEXAS FILM INCENTIVE PROGRAM:   
OPERATION AND STANDARDS 
The Texas Film Commission (“Commission”)—a division of the 
Texas Music, Film, Television and Multimedia Office—administers the 
Texas film incentive program, formally called the Moving Image 
Industry Incentive Program (“Incentive Program”).94  The Incentive 
Program provides filmmakers various types of assistance, including 
state-funded financial grants.95  For a grant to be approved, the 
Commission “must consider at a minimum:  (1) the current and likely 
future effect a moving image project will have on employment, tourism, 
                                                           
89.  See Hollis L. Hyans & Open Weaver Banks, Should Filmmakers Be Content to Have 
Taxing Authorities Judge Their Content? , MORRISON & FOERSTER NEWS 1, 2 (Winter 
2012), http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/120117-State-Local-Tax-Insights-Winter-
2012.pdf [perma.cc/2GSR-J9CX]. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 11-13X-3(b)(8)(F) (2016)). 
92. Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148.546(9) (West 2015); see Film Tax Credit 
Program Guidelines, PA. DEP’T OF CMTY. & ECON. DEV. (Oct. 2009), http://filminpa.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/Film-Tax-Credit_Guidelines-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/57YX-BF8M] 
(providing that “[t]he Pennsylvania Film Office may consider,” among other criteria, “whether 
the project will tend to foster a positive image of Pennsylvania”). 
93. See Ahmad, supra note 57, at 418 (2009) (citations omitted) (identifying four 
categories of content restrictions in state film incentive programs: “(1) categorical; (2) negative 
image; (3) implicit; and (4) carte blanche”).  Ahmad also provides a comprehensive listing of the 
content restrictions found in the various state incentive programs.  See id. at 410–19. 
94. See Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2015) (explaining 
that the Music, Film, Television and Multimedia Office assigned Incentive Program administration 
to one of its divisions, the Texas Film Commission). 
95. See Texas Moving Image Industry Incentive Program, TEX. FILM COMM’N, 
https://gov.texas.gov/film/page/miiip [http://perma.cc/88HL-FCBU]. 
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and economic activity in [Texas]; and (2) the amount of a production 
company’s in-state spending for a moving image project.”96  The Texas 
Administrative Code provides that “[n]ot every project will qualify for a 
grant,” and that the Commission “is not required to act on any grant 
application.”97  In considering applications, “the Commission will 
review the [production’s content] and advise the potential Applicant on 
whether the content will preclude the project from receiving a grant.”98  
The Commission “may deny an application or eventual payment on an 
application because of [a project’s] inappropriate content or content that 
portrays Texas or Texans in a negative fashion, as determined by the 
Commission.”99  Furthermore, “[i]n determining whether to act on or 
deny [a grant] application, the Commission shall consider general 
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of 
the citizens of Texas.”100 
Finally, “the Commission will review the final content . . . to 
determine if any substantial changes occurred during production” which 
would lead to the grant’s denial.101  If the Commission denies an 
                                                           
96. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.024(a) (West 2017).  The Commission’s rules require 
it to consider “the following criteria to assess, in the aggregate,” the project’s potential economic 
impact on the State of Texas: 
(A) The financial viability of the Applicant and the likelihood of successful project 
execution and planned spending in the State of Texas; 
(B) Proposed spending on existing state production infrastructure (such as 
soundstages and industry vendors); 
(C) The number of Texas jobs estimated to be created by the project; 
(D) The ability to promote Texas as a tourist destination through the conduct of the 
project and planned expenditure of funds; 
(E) The magnitude of estimated expenditures in Texas; and 
(F) Whether the project will be directed or produced by an individual who is a 
Texas Resident (where the term ‘produced by’ is intended to encompass a non-
honorary producer with direct involvement in the day to day production of the 
project, but above the level of line producer). 
13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §121.9(c)(3) (2017). 
97. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.4(b) (2017).  
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.4(c) (2017). 
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application, it will notify the applicant of the denial and “whether the 
denial is based on failure to meet the minimum program requirements, 
insufficient economic impact, or inappropriate content.”102  “Neither the 
approval of the Qualifying Application nor any award of funds shall 
obligate the Commission in any way to make any additional award of 
funds.”103  Additionally, “all funding decisions made by the 
Commission are final and are not subject to appeal.”104  
With provisions such as these, Texas’ Incentive Program is 
perhaps the most restrictive among all state incentive programs.105  
Texas statutes require a project script to be reviewed twice:  a 
preliminary review before production begins,106 and a final review once 
production is complete.107  Notably, “Texas has the strongest script-
review component because it is the only state with the requirement in 
statute.”108  Also, by withholding incentives until after the Commission 
completes its second review, Texas differs from many other states 
which typically pay incentives upfront to filmmakers.109  For these 
reasons, filmmakers denied the incentives have challenged the Incentive 
Program’s constitutionality in court.110  Although the cases dealt with 
Texas’ Incentive Program, their reasoning and conclusions, as discussed 
below, could also apply to other states’ programs.  Before analyzing 
                                                           
102. 13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.9(c)(5) (2017). 
103. Id. 
104. 13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.9(c)(6) (2017). 
105. See Brice Wallace, The Screening Process:  A Form of Censorship or a Way to 
Safeguard Taxpayer Money?, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 16, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews. 
com/article/705263109/The-screening-process-A-form-of-censorship-or-a-way-to-safeguard-tax 
payer-money.html? [http://perma.cc/6V7F-SG27]. 
106. 13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §121.9(c) (2017). 
107. See 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.4(b) (2017); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(f) 
(West 2017). 
108. Wallace, supra note 105. 
109. Reeve Hamilton, Robert Rodriguez Film at Issue in Incentive Debate, TEXAS 
TRIBUNE (Sept. 3, 2010, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2010/09/03/robert-rodriguez-
film-at-issue-in-incentive-debate/ [http://perma.cc/3E5U-MDD2]. 
110. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., v. Tex. Film Comm’n, 483 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2016); Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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whether such provisions violate the First Amendment, however, this 
article first outlines the relevant First Amendment doctrines and 
precedents.  
V. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FILM:   
A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Supreme Court noted: 
[M]otion pictures are a significant medium for the communication 
of ideas.  They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety 
of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social 
doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all 
artistic expression.  The importance of motion pictures as an organ 
of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed 
to entertain as well as to inform.111  
The Court went on to hold that the First Amendment protects 
motion pictures.112  Such protection prohibits the government from 
censoring or “restrict[ing] expression because of its message, ideas, 
subject matter, or content.”113  As a result, “[d]iscrimination against 
speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”114   
Does this protection prohibit states from denying incentives to 
filmmakers because of an objection to their film’s content?  To help 
answer that question, the following two parts examine two relevant First 
Amendment doctrines:  public forum and unconstitutional conditions.  
                                                           
111. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
112. Id. 
113. Alicia M. Choi, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley:  A Dispute over the 
“Decency and Respect” Provision, 32 AKRON L. REV. 327, 336 (1999); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. I; Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995).  
114. Rosenberger 515 U.S. at 828 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 641–643 (1994)). 
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VI. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
A. Classifications of Public Fora 
 The Supreme Court uses forum analysis “to determine when a 
governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place 
limitations on free speech.”115  There are three “types of fora:  the 
traditional public forum, the public forum created by government 
designation, and the nonpublic [or limited] forum.”116  In each forum, 
certain standards limit government restrictions on free speech.117   
A traditional public forum is one, like a street or park, that “‘by 
long tradition or by government fiat’ . . . has been ‘devoted to assembly 
and debate.’”118  Courts apply strict scrutiny when the government seeks 
to restrict speech in such a forum.119  The government must show that 
the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling government interest 
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.120  
Next, a designated public forum is one the government 
“intentionally open[s] . . . for public discourse.”121  The government 
may allow “for expressive activity by part or all of the public.”122  
However, if the government seeks to restrict speech in this forum, 
courts apply strict scrutiny, just as with a traditional public forum.123 
Finally, a nonpublic or limited public forum is one the government 
opens “limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the 
discussion of certain subjects.”124  Here, the government may impose 
                                                           
115. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010). 
116. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).  
117. Id. at 800. 
118. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 667 (1988) (quotation 
omitted). 
119. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. (citation omitted). 
122. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). 
123. Id. at 678.  
124. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (citation omitted). 
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restrictions provided “the restrictions are ‘reasonable and [are] not an 
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker’s view.’”125  Furthermore, restrictions must be “reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum.”126  Thus, speech restrictions 
in a limited public forum are valid, so long as they are “reasonable and 
viewpoint-neutral.”127  
Although forums often consist of spaces where speakers may 
gather to address others, not all forums involve physical property.128  
Speakers may, for instance, “seek access to some government-
controlled ‘channel[s] of communication.’”129  When determining the 
scope of a forum, the Court has held that the “focus [is] on the precise 
‘access sought by the speaker.’”130  Thus, “any government-controlled 
means of communication can qualify” as a forum, including “a charity 
drive, a candidate debate, an internal mail system, and even the 
expenditure of money to support private speech.”131  The fact that “[a] 
public forum can be created by money, not just real estate”132 is 
significant to state film incentive programs, as discussed infra. 
B. Cases Involving Government Funding of Private Speech and Forum 
Creation 
1. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia 
provides an example of a public forum created by the government’s 
                                                           
125. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (alteration in original). 
126. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001). 
127. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (citation omitted).  
128. Norman T. Deutsch, Does Anybody Really Need a Limited Public Forum?, 82 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 107, 119–120 (2008).  
129. Id. at 119 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801).  
130. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801).  
131. Id. at 120 (citations omitted). 
132. Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 686 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384 (1993)). 
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disbursement of funds to certain groups.133  In Rosenberger, the 
University of Virginia provided reimbursement funds to certain student 
groups for the printing of their publications.134  These funds were 
intended “to support a broad range of extracurricular student activities 
. . . ‘related to the educational purposes of the University.’”135 However, 
the university denied fund payments to student groups engaged in 
religious activities.136  The case involved a constitutional challenge to 
this denial.137  The Supreme Court found that the government’s purpose 
for providing these payments was “to encourage a diversity of views 
from private speakers.”138  As a result, it created a limited public 
forum.139  Even though the payments were made from a fund that was 
“a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, 
. . . the same principles [were] applicable.”140  Thus, the Court held that 
the university’s denial of funding to religious groups constituted 
impermissible viewpoint-discrimination and, therefore, violated the 
First Amendment.141  
2. National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley 
Not all government funding of private speech creates a forum, 
however.142  When, unlike in Rosenberger, the government funds 
private speech for a purpose other than encouraging viewpoint diversity, 
courts have declined to apply the public forum doctrine.143  For 
                                                           
133. See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 
(1995). 
134. Id. at 822–23. 
135. Id. at 824. 
136. Id.at 822–23. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 834. 
139. Id. at 830. 
140. Id.  
141. Id. at 837. 
142. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998). 
143. See generally id. 
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example, in National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of a statutory provision mandating that 
the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) use certain criteria in 
assessing applications for government grants.144  The provision 
specified that “artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by 
which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration general 
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of 
the American public.”145 
Congress enacted the above provision in response to public 
concern that arose in 1989 over the NEA’s funding of two controversial 
works.146  The first work, entitled “The Perfect Moment,” was “a 1989 
retrospective of photographer Robert Mapplethorpe’s work” that 
“included homoerotic photographs that several Members of Congress 
condemned as pornographic.”147  To fund the project, the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Institute of Contemporary Art used $30,000 of its NEA-
awarded visual arts grant.148  The second controversial piece of art, 
Andres Serrano’s “Piss Christ”—”a photograph of a crucifix immersed 
in urine”—was also funded by an NEA-supported organization’s 
grant.149  
In 1990, to address the concerns these controversies raised, 
Congress amended the NEA provision to provide that “no NEA funds 
‘may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials, which in 
the judgment of [the NEA] may be considered obscene.’”150  Congress 
also adopted “[section] 954(d)(1), which directs the [NEA] Chairperson, 
in establishing procedures to judge the artistic merit of grant 
applications, ‘to tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency 
                                                           
144. Id. at 572. 
145. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990)). 
146. Id. at 574 (citing 135 CONG. REC. 22372). 
147. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. 22372). 
148. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. 22372). 
149. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. 22372). 
150.  Id. at 575 (citing Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 738–42 (1989)). 
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and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American 
public.’”151 
National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley involved four artists 
denied NEA grants in accordance with the new standards.152  Joined by 
the National Association of Artists’ Organizations, the artists brought a 
facial challenge to section 954(d)(1), calling it “void for vagueness and 
impermissibly viewpoint based.”153  On appeal to the Supreme Court, 
after the district court and court of appeals both found the provision to 
violate the First Amendment,154 respondents argued that the provision 
amounts to “viewpoint discrimination because it rejects any artistic 
speech that either fails to respect mainstream values or offends 
standards of decency.”155  In his dissent, Justice Souter stated: 
The NEA, like the student activities fund in Rosenberger, is a 
subsidy scheme created to encourage expression of a diversity of 
views from private speakers. . . .  Given this congressional choice 
to sustain freedom of expression, Rosenberger teaches that the First 
Amendment forbids decisions based on viewpoint popularity.  So 
long as Congress chooses to subsidize expressive endeavors at 
large, it has no business requiring the NEA to turn down funding 
applications of artists and exhibitors who devote their “freedom of 
thought, imagination, and inquiry” to defying our tastes, our 
beliefs, or our values.  It may not use the NEA’s purse to 
“suppres[s] . . . dangerous ideas.”156 
The Finley majority, however, disagreed with Justice Souter on 
this point and determined that Rosenberger did not apply.157  Instead, it 
held that the NEA’s disbursements of funds required the organization to 
                                                           
151. Id. at 577 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990)). 
152. Id. at 569. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 578. 
155. Id. at 580. 
156. Id. at 613–14 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation 
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)). 
157. Id. at 586. 
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make “esthetic judgments” in applying its “inherently content-based 
‘excellence’ threshold for NEA support.”158  This threshold, the Court 
noted, distinguished Finley  
from the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger—which was available to 
all student organizations that were “‘related to the educational 
purpose of the University’”—and from comparably objective 
decisions on allocating public benefits, such as access to a school 
auditorium or a municipal theater, or the second class mailing 
privileges available to “‘all newspapers and other periodical 
publications.’”159  
Furthermore, the Court noted, NEA grants are limited, requiring 
the NEA to fund only “the worthiest projects submitted for grants.”160  
The Court made clear, however, that it was not the scarcity of NEA 
funding that distinguished the case from Rosenberger, but “the 
competitive process according to which the grants are allocated.”161  
This process required NEA panelists to make subjective decisions about 
which projects “deserve funding compared to the proposals of other 
grant seekers.”162  As the Court saw it, “[i]n the context of arts funding, 
in contrast to many other subsidies, the Government does not 
indiscriminately ‘encourage a diversity of views from private 
speakers.’”163 
                                                           
158. Id. 
159. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
160. David Hungerford, Note, The Fallacy of Finley:  Public Fora, Viewpoint 
Discrimination, and the NEA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 249, 276 (1999) (citing Finley v. Nat’l 
Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1575 (C.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 
1996), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (observing that NEA funds are a limited resource)). 
161. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586. 
162. Hungerford, supra note 160, at 276 (citing Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (noting that NEA 
makes funding decisions through the use of the competitive process)). 
163.  Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 834–35 (1995)).  According to one commentator, “the Court seemed to suggest that the 
point of the program is to encourage good art regardless of whether it leads to a public forum-like 
environment.  Thus, for the majority, diversity of viewpoint in NEA funded art would seem to be 
more of a happy by-product of the program than its intended goal.”  Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., NEA 
v. Finley:  A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14 (1999). 
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The Court also found it significant that the NEA interpreted the 
“decency and respect” provision as not an “absolute restriction,” but 
instead, “as merely hortatory.”164  According to the NEA, the provision 
“adds ‘considerations’ to the grant-making process; it does not preclude 
awards to projects that might be deemed ‘indecent’ or ‘disrespectful,’ 
nor place conditions on grants, or even specify that those factors must 
be given any particular weight in reviewing an application.”165  The 
Court agreed with the NEA, observing that “the text of [section] 
954(d)(1) imposes no categorical requirement.”166  Instead, the text 
operates as “advisory language” that warns the NEA to take “decency 
and respect” into consideration.167  This “advisory language,” the Court 
observed, “stands in sharp contrast to congressional efforts to prohibit 
the funding of certain classes of speech.  When Congress has in fact 
intended to affirmatively constrain the NEA’s grant-making authority, it 
has done so in no uncertain terms.”168  As an example, the Court pointed 
to Congress’ prohibition on the NEA’s funding of obscenity in which 
Congress clearly states that obscenity “shall not be funded.”169  The 
Court concluded that “the ‘decency and respect’ criteria do not silence 
speakers by expressly ‘threatening censorship of ideas.’”170  
In a later case, the Court characterized its Finley decision, stating:  
[In Finley], we upheld an art funding program that required the 
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to use content-based 
criteria in making funding decisions.  We explained that “any 
content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the 
grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts 
funding.”  In particular, “[t]he very assumption of the NEA is that 
grants will be awarded according to the ‘artistic worth of competing 
applicants,’ and absolute neutrality is simply inconceivable.”  We 
expressly declined to apply forum analysis, reasoning that it would 
                                                           
164. Finley, 524 U.S. at 580. 
165. Id. at 580–81. 
166. Id. at 581. 
167. Id. at 582. 
168. Id. at 581. 
169. Id. (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(2)). 
170. Id. at 583 (citation omitted). 
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conflict with “NEA’s mandate . . . to make esthetic judgments, and 
the inherently content-based ‘excellence’ threshold for NEA 
support.”171 
C. Forum Analysis and Film Incentive Program Restrictions 
The Supreme Court decisions in Rosenberger and Finley suggest 
that forum analysis is likely inappropriate when considering film 
incentive program restrictions.  In Rosenberger, the funding program’s 
purpose was to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.172  
State film incentive programs, on the other hand, serve to encourage 
economic activity and growth in the state.173  This is accomplished, in 
part, by providing grants to films that will attract tourism and other 
economic activity by presenting the state in a positive light.174  Thus, a 
state may require its film incentive program to determine funding based 
on how the film portrays the state.175  This closely parallels Finley, 
where the statutory provision required the NEA to make subjective, 
content-based decisions when awarding funding.176  Because film 
incentive programs resemble the funding guidelines in Finley, as 
opposed to those in Rosenberger, the public forum doctrine and its 
prohibitions against discrimination would seem inapplicable in 
challenges to film incentive program restrictions. 
VII. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
In considering incentive programs as a form of government 
benefit, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may be more applicable 
here than forum doctrine.  Under the unconstitutional conditions 
                                                           
171. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (quoting Finley, 524 
U.S. at 586). 
172. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 821. 
173. Zach Huitink, An Update on State Film Industry Incentives, THE COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOV’TS (June 15, 2011, 12:02 PM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/update-state-film-
industry-incentives [https://perma.cc/K5R8-H9V6]. 
174. Id. 
175. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.024(a) (West 2017). 
176. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586. 
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doctrine, “the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a 
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech’ 
even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”177  The Supreme Court has 
“made clear that even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable 
governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him 
the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon 
which the government may not rely.”178  For example, the government 
may not rely on a reason that infringes upon a person’s constitutionally-
protected free speech right.179  If the government were able to deny a 
person benefits based on that person’s speech, then that person’s 
“exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.  
This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could 
not command directly.’”180   
A. The Supreme Court Addresses Government Funding and 
Unconstitutional Conditions 
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court applied the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine.181  Rust involved a challenge to a prohibition on 
government funding of family-planning clinics that advocated for, 
counseled about, or made referrals for abortions.182  Title X of the 
Public Health Services Act provides federal funding for family-planning 
services, but prohibits that funding from going to programs that 
included abortion as a family-planning method.183  Fund recipients are 
                                                           
177. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (citing Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
178. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the denial of a variety of government 
benefits, including tax exemptions, unemployment benefits, welfare payments, and government 
employment). 
181. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991). 
182. See David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions:  Charting Spheres of 
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 684 (1992) (citing 42 C.F.R. § 
59.10(a) (1991)). 
183. Rust, 500 U.S. at 173. 
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expressly prohibited from referring clients to an abortion provider, even 
if the client requested the referral.184  The statute also prohibits 
recipients from engaging in activities that “encourage, promote or 
advocate abortion as a method of family planning.”185 
Title X recipients and doctors, who supervised Title X-funded 
projects, challenged these restrictions.  They contended that the 
restrictions are unconstitutional “because they condition the receipt of a 
benefit, in [this case government] funding, on the relinquishment of a 
constitutional right, the right to engage in abortion advocacy and 
counseling.”186  The restrictions constitute impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination, they argued, because Title X prohibits “‘all discussion 
about abortion as a lawful option.’”187  
In upholding Title X’s restrictions on abortion-related speech, the 
Supreme Court observed that “when the Government appropriates 
public funds to establish a program, it is entitled to define the limits of 
that program.”188  The Court explained: 
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, 
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it 
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time 
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the 
problem in another way.  In so doing, the Government has not 
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to 
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.189 
Consequently, the Court held, a provision requiring “that federal 
funds will be used only to further the purposes of a grant does not 
violate constitutional rights.”190 
                                                           
184. Id. at 180. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 196. 
187. Id. at 192 (quotation omitted). 
188. Id. at 194. 
189. Id. at 193. 
190. Id. at 198. 
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The Rust Court found it significant that the restriction only applies 
to speech within the government-funded program and not to speech by 
program participants outside of that program.191  Finding the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine inapplicable here, the Court 
observed that “the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is 
instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for 
which they were authorized.”192  “‘[U]nconstitutional conditions’ 
cases,” the Court explained, “involve situations in which the 
Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy 
rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively 
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside 
the scope of the federally funded program.”193  It is true, the Court 
continued, that “employees’ freedom of expression is limited during the 
time that they actually work for the [government-funded] project; but 
this limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employment 
in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding 
authority.”194  In other words, “while family planning counselors may 
have a constitutional right to talk about abortion, they have no 
constitutional right to do so while being funded by the government.”195  
Rust established that when the government subsidizes speech, it 
may favor one viewpoint over another, provided subsidy recipients are 
allowed to espouse the disfavored viewpoint outside the subsidized 
program.196  As the Court observed, “‘[a] refusal to fund protected 
activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 
“penalty” on that activity.’”197  Likewise, “a legislature’s decision not to 
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the 
right.”198  “The reasoning of these decisions is simple:  ‘although 
                                                           
191. Id. at 199 n.5. 
192. Id. at 196. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 199. 
195. Cole, supra note 182, at 676 n.172. 
196. See generally Rust, 500 U.S. at 193–200.  
197. Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980)). 
198. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983). 
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government may not place obstacles in the path of a [person’s] exercise 
of . . . freedom of [speech], it need not remove those not of its own 
creation.’”199  Therefore, it is “well established that the government can 
make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes speech,”200 as 
“subsidies, by definition . . . do not restrict any speech.”201 
B. The Rust Holding and Film Incentive Program Restrictions 
Applying the reasoning in Rust to film incentive program 
restrictions, it would seem that such restrictions would be found valid 
under the First Amendment.  Film incentive programs are created for 
specific purposes:  to spur employment and economic activity, to build 
and strengthen the production industry within a state, and to attract 
tourism.202  They are not created to support private speakers.203  The 
Texas statute, for example, provides that the Texas Film Commission’s 
method for determining grants must, at a minimum, consider:  “(1) the 
current and likely future effect a moving image project will have on 
employment, tourism, and economic activity in [Texas]; and (2) the 
amount of a production company’s in-state spending for a moving 
image project.”204  The statute also provides that the office “may deny 
an application because of [a film’s] inappropriate content or content that 
portrays Texas or Texans in a negative fashion, as determined by the 
office.”205  Much of this standard focuses on economic criteria, such as 
the amount of money a production will spend in the state, how many 
                                                           
199. Id. at 549–50 (citation omitted). 
200. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188–89 (2007). 
201. Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 765 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
202. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (quoting 20 
U.S.C. § 951(5) (1990)). 
203. The purpose of the program was also a relevant factor in Finley.  There the majority 
observed that “[i]n the 1990 Amendments that incorporated § 954(d)(1), Congress modified the 
declaration of purpose in the NEA’s enabling act to provide that arts funding should ‘contribute 
to public support and confidence in the use of taxpayer funds,’ and that ‘public funds . . . must 
ultimately serve public purposes the Congress defines.’”  Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(5)).  This 
could have been an additional factor in the Court’s decision to uphold the “decency and respect” 
provision at issue in that case. 
204. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.024(a) (West 2017).  
205. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e) (West 2017).  
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people it will employ, and the types of jobs it will create.206  The way 
the film depicts the state and its residents and the production’s tourism 
and economic impact are merely additional factors to be considered. 207 
 As Rust illustrates, the government may impose viewpoint-based 
restrictions on the granting of subsidies provided recipients remain free 
to say what they wish outside the confines of the program.208  Such is 
the case here.  Filmmakers remain free to make their films even if 
denied an incentive program grant.  Thus, Texas’ exercise of viewpoint 
discrimination in the granting of film incentives, to carry out the 
purposes of its subsidy program, does not necessarily violate the First 
Amendment.  This is not to say that film incentive program 
administrators may engage in all types of viewpoint discrimination.  In 
his dissenting opinion in Finley, Justice Souter criticized the Court’s 
application of Rust to the facts before it:  Although the Court in Rust 
“‘recognized that when the government appropriates public funds to 
promote a particular policy of its own, it is entitled to say what it 
wishes.’”209  The Court, Souter continues,  
added the important qualifying language that “this is not to suggest 
that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the 
freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the 
Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify 
Government control over the content of expression.”  Indeed, 
outside of the contexts of government-as-buyer and government-as-
speaker, [the Court has] held time and time again that Congress 
may not “discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as 
to aim at the suppression of . . . ideas.”210  
                                                           
206. See 13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §121.9(c)(3) (2017). 
207. See id. 
208. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198–99. 
209. Finley, 524 U.S. at 612 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194)). 
210. Id. (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548)); see also Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 384 (1993) (holding that when the government subsidizes private 
speech, it may not “favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others”); Hannegan v. 
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 149 (1946) (holding that the Postmaster General may not deny 
subsidies to certain periodicals on the ground that they are “morally improper and not for the 
public welfare and the public good”). 
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While the government has considerable leeway to restrict to whom 
it issues subsidies, as Justice Souter and Rust indicate, that leeway in 
not unlimited.  Part VIII considers where that limit lies. 
VIII.THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S APPLICABILITY  
TO GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
In his dissent in the Finley appellate court decision, Justice 
Kleinfeld discussed two cases that provide some guidance here.211  In 
one of those cases, Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick,212 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals “held that customs duties exemptions for any 
educational or cultural materials could not exclude propaganda films 
based on their content and viewpoint.”213  In the other case, Big Mama 
Rag, Inc. v. United States,214 the D.C. Circuit held that “a tax exemption 
generally available to educational organizations could not be denied 
based on a regulation requiring full and fair exposition of facts enabling 
a reader to draw an independent conclusion.”215  According to Justice 
Kleinfeld, the reason that the denials of benefits in these cases were 
found to be unconstitutional was because, “[u]nder these cases, all 
applicants in the class were entitled to the financial benefit from the 
government, unless the content of their speech was contrary to 
government standards.”216  Justice Kleinfeld contrasted this with the arts 
subsidies in Finley, in which “no applicant is entitled to the financial 
benefit.”217  Thus, where a government benefit is available to all of a 
class or category’s members, it may be unconstitutional to deny the 
benefit based on the content of one’s speech.  This is consistent with 
                                                           
211. Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 684 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
212. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988). 
213. Finley, 100 F.3d at 686 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citing Bullfrog Films, 847 F.2d 
502). 
214. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
215. Finley, 100 F.3d at 686 (citing Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d 1030). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
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Rosenberger’s holding.218  On the other hand, consistent with Finley, 
when the benefit is only available to a limited number of a class or 
category’s members, then denial of the benefit based on content may be 
constitutional.   
The opinion in Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson elaborated on 
this point.219  There, the issue was the denial of “an NEA grant to a 
literary magazine because the governor and state arts commission 
thought a poem it published was indecent.”220  In its rejection of the 
First Amendment challenge, the First Circuit explained that “denial of a 
grant was not suppression of speech, and the grant selection process 
necessarily discriminated based on content.”221  The court explained: 
Public funding of the arts seeks “not to abridge, restrict, or censor 
speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge” 
artistic expression.  A disappointed grant applicant cannot complain 
that his work has been suppressed, but only that another’s has been 
promoted in its stead.  The decision to withhold support is 
unavoidably based in some part on the “subject matter” or 
“content” of expression, for the very assumption of public funding 
of the arts is that decisions will be made according to the literary or 
artistic worth of competing applicants.222 
In summarizing this decision’s significance, Justice Kleinfeld noted that 
just because all denied grant applicants have the same freedom of 
expression right, that does not mean that all denied grant applicants can 
properly bring suit alleging First Amendment violations.223 
                                                           
218. See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 
(1995). 
219. See generally Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976). 
220. Finley, 100 F.3d at 685 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citing Advocates for the Arts, 532 
F.2d at 795). 
221. Id.   
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
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Thus, the requirement of “absolute neutrality” does not apply to 
public grants for speech-related activities as it does in a public forum.224  
The Supreme Court offered guidance on this point:  
[W]hile it may be feasible to allocate space in an auditorium 
without consideration of the expressive content of competing 
applicants’ productions, such neutrality in a program for public 
funding of the arts is inconceivable.  The purpose of such a 
program is to promote “art,” the very definition of which requires 
an exercise of judgment from case to case. . . .  Solutions that may 
work for an auditorium, such as scheduling on a first-come-first-
served basis or upon a prescribed showing of likely box-office 
success (if that is a solution), are simply not available to a program 
for funding the arts.  If such a program is to fulfill its purpose, the 
exercise of editorial judgment by those administering it is 
inescapable.225 
Different constitutional standards, then, apply to speech subsidies 
than to speech regulation.226  The justification for this is that 
“[r]egulations directly restrict speech; subsidies do not.  Subsidies, it is 
true, may indirectly abridge speech, but only if the funding scheme is 
‘manipulated’ to have a ‘coercive effect’ on those who do not hold the 
subsidized position.”227  However, proving a “coercive effect” by a 
limited spending program that does not constitute a public forum, 
is virtually impossible, because simply denying a subsidy “does not 
‘coerce’ belief,” and because the criterion of unconstitutionality is 
whether denial of the subsidy threatens “to drive certain ideas or 
viewpoints from the marketplace.”  Absent such a threat, “the 
Government may allocate . . . funding according to criteria that 
                                                           
224. Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d at 796. 
225. Id. 
226. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
227. Id. at 552–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a 
criminal penalty at stake.”228 
A. Vagueness 
This leniency for speech subsidies, that is prohibited for speech 
regulation, also applies to vagueness concerns regarding subsidy-award 
standards.229  Generally speaking, vague laws—those that do not clearly 
articulate their application’s standards or the speech to be restricted—
are void.230  This is so for several reasons.  First, a vague law “may ‘trap 
the innocent by not providing fair warning’” about what the law 
forbids.231  Additionally, a vague law allows law enforcement to 
interpret it subjectively, leading to the “‘arbitrary and discriminatory 
application’” of the law.232  A vague law can also chill speech for fear 
that the speech may violate the law:  “[u]ncertain meanings inevitably 
lead citizens to ‘“steer far wider of the unlawful zone” . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’”233  
Even though vagueness is generally not permitted in a regulation, 
some vagueness may be permitted in the creation of subsidies.234  For 
example, in Finley, the “decency and respect” provision was challenged 
for vagueness.235  In his dissent in the Finley appellate court decision, 
Justice Kleinfeld, who seemingly would have upheld the provisions’ 
constitutionality, remarked:  
Artists seeking grants have no property right to them, and their 
liberty to express themselves as they choose is not regulated by the 
                                                           
228. Id. (alteration in original). 
229. See id. 
230. Bullfrog Films, 847 F.2d at 512 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
108–09 (1972)). 
231. Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108). 
232. Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09). 
233. Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109). 
234. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588–89 (1998). 
235. Id. at 589. 
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grants.  Vagueness law has been developed under the Fifth 
Amendment to protect people from the taking of liberty or property 
without fair notice of what they may not do, and without protection 
against arbitrary enforcement.  First Amendment vagueness 
doctrine applies to government action relating to speech if the 
government regulates speech or conditions a generally available 
benefit upon the content of speech.  An artist applying for an NEA 
grant has no formula, and is not entitled to one, for the painting or 
performance which will produce a grant.  None of the purposes of 
vagueness law apply to prizes.236 
Although such provisions’ terms would likely raise vagueness 
concerns in a regulatory framework or criminal statute context, the 
Supreme Court in Finley concluded that the provision was not 
unconstitutionally vague.237  The Court reasoned that, in the context of 
these arts grants, speakers likely would not be deterred from engaging 
in particular speech.238  Despite the Court’s recognition of such criteria’ 
potential chilling effect, it determined that “when the Government is 
acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of 
imprecision are not constitutionally severe.”239  Thus, “although the 
First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, . . . 
the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria 
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a 
criminal penalty at stake.”240  This applies to both vagueness and 
viewpoint discrimination.241   
                                                           
236. Finley, 100 F.3d at 689 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
237. Finley, 524 U.S. at 588–89 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963)) 
(noting that “[u]nder the First and Fifth Amendments, speakers are protected from arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement of vague standards”)). 
238. Id. at 588 (citations omitted). 
239. Id. at 589–90 (citations omitted) (noting that “[i]n the context of selective subsidies, 
it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity,” and that “[s]ection 954(d)(1) 
merely adds some imprecise considerations to an already subjective selection process[;] [i]t does 
not, on its face, impermissibly infringe on First or Fifth Amendment rights”). 
240. Id. at 587–88 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 
587–88 (1983)). 
241. See id. at 588–89. 
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B. Viewpoint Discrimination 
In Finley, there was no allegation of “discrimination in any 
particular funding decision.”242  Thus, the Court had “no occasion . . . to 
address an as-applied challenge in a situation where the denial of a grant 
may be shown to be the product of invidious viewpoint 
discrimination.”243  The Court therefore upheld the constitutionality of 
the provision, “[u]nless and until § 954(d)(1) [the ‘decency and respect 
provision’] is applied in a manner that raises concern about the 
suppression of disfavored viewpoints.”244  “If the NEA were to leverage 
its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a 
penalty on disfavored viewpoints,” the Court explained, “then we would 
confront a different case.  We have stated that, even in the provision of 
subsidies, the Government may not ‘aim at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas,’ and if a subsidy were ‘manipulated’ to have a 
‘coercive effect,’ then relief could be appropriate.”245   
In what situation, then, does the denial of a subsidy “aim at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas,” such that it is “manipulated” to have a 
“coercive effect?”  The following two cases, which found this effect to 
have occurred, may provide the answer. 
IX. FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS IN ARTS FUNDING CASES 
A. New York City Withholds Funds  
as a Result of an Objectionable Art Exhibit 
In Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York, an 
art exhibit generated controversy when it was first shown in London.246  
Entitled “Sensation:  Young British Artists from the Saatchi 
Collection,” the exhibit featured “90 works from the collection of 
British advertising magnate Charles Saatchi,” including: 
                                                           
242. Id. at 586 (noting that, “[i]n fact, after filing suit to challenge § 954(d)(1), two of the 
individual respondents received NEA grants”). 
243. Id. at 587. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 550); Ark. Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 
237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
246. Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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Damien Hirst’s “A Thousand Years,” composed of flies, maggots, a 
cow’s head, sugar, and water[;] another Hirst work, “This Little 
Piggy went to Market, This Little Piggy Stayed Home,” a split pig 
carcass floating in formaldehyde; Marc Quinn’s[] “Self,” a bust of 
the artist made from nine pints of his frozen blood; and, most 
controversial, artist Chris Ofili’s work, titled “The Holy Virgin 
Mary[]” . . . —a depiction of a black Madonna adorned with 
elephant dung and sexually-explicit photos.247  
In 1999, the controversy followed the exhibit to the United States when 
the Brooklyn Museum prepared to showcase it on a temporary basis.248   
The City of New York provided funding to the Brooklyn Museum 
for operational purposes, but generally not “‘for direct curatorial or 
artistic services’” or for the exhibit at issue.249  Nevertheless, the city 
threatened to terminate all the museum’s funding “unless it canceled the 
Exhibit.”250  The city found particularly objectionable Chris Ofili’s “The 
Holy Virgin Mary,” made of elephant dung, among other materials, and 
containing “small photographs of buttocks and female genitalia 
scattered on the background.”251  New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, 
speaking publicly, called the exhibit “sick” and “disgusting.”252  
Giuliani singled out “The Holy Virgin Mary” as being “offensive to 
Catholics” and “an attack on religion.”253  Explaining the city’s threat to 
terminate the museum’s funding, Giuliani declared: 
You don’t have a right to a government subsidy to desecrate 
someone else’s religion.  And therefore we will do everything that 
we can to remove funding from the [Museum] until the [Museum] 
director comes to his senses.  And realizes that if you are a 
                                                           
247. The Art of Controversy, PBS (Oct. 8, 1999, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/entertainment-july-dec99-art_10-8/ [http://perma.cc/Z7F3-DJGR]. 
248. See generally Brooklyn Inst. of Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 184. 
249. Id. at 184, 189 (quotation omitted). 
250. Id. at 191. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at 186. 
253. Id. 
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government subsidized enterprise then you can’t do things that 
desecrate the most personal and deeply held views of the people in 
society.254 
The museum refused to cancel the exhibit, leading the city to 
withhold “funds already appropriated to the Museum for operating 
expenses and maintenance and [file suit seeking] to eject the Museum 
from the City-owned land and building in which the Museum’s 
collections [had] been housed for over one hundred years.”255  In 
response, the museum filed suit against both the city and the mayor 
“seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, to prevent the defendants 
from punishing or retaliating against the Museum for displaying the 
Exhibit, in violation of the Museum’s rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”256  
In reviewing the case, the district court found that “the facts 
establish[ed] an ongoing effort by the Mayor and the City to coerce the 
Museum into relinquishing its First Amendment rights.”257  The court 
referred to the Supreme Court’s “unconstitutional conditions” principle, 
noting that although a person is not entitled to a government benefit, the 
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes 
his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in 
freedom of speech.”258  Here, the City of New York had forced the 
museum to choose between obtaining a financial benefit and enjoying 
its First Amendment rights.259  In condemning the city’s actions, the 
court held that by removing the Museum’s funding, the city 
“discriminate[d] invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to ‘aim at 
the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”260  The court recognized that the 
government’s purpose is the determining factor in deciding whether 
                                                           
254. Id. at 191 (quoting New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani). 
255. Id. at 186. 
256. Id. at 191–92. 
257. Id. at 198. 
258. Id. at 199 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
259. Id. at 200. 
260. Id. (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 
(1983)). 
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speech restrictions constitute viewpoint discrimination.261  Here, the 
government’s purpose was clear; the City of New York confirmed that 
its purpose for removing the museum’s funding was directly related to 
the viewpoints expressed in “The Holy Virgin Mary.”262  Accordingly, 
the city’s conduct unequivocally violated the First Amendment.263  
The court distinguished its present situation from that in Finley, 
where the Court found a provision adding “decency and respect” 
considerations to be constitutional.264  In doing so, the Court “did ‘not 
perceive a realistic danger’ that [the provision would] be used ‘to 
effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular views.’”265  
According to the Brooklyn Institute court, the difference was that Finley 
involved “considerations” contemplated when deciding whether to 
award a grant, which did not facially constitute viewpoint 
discrimination.266  The provisions in Finley also “‘[did] not preclude 
awards to projects that might be deemed “indecent” or “disrespectful” 
nor place conditions on grants.’”267    In Brooklyn Institute, however, the 
City of New York had already appropriated the museum’s funding and 
withdrew it because it objected to an exhibit’s content.268 
B. San Antonio Defunds Community Arts Center  
Due to Objectionable Programming 
Similar to Brooklyn Institute, Esperanza Peace and Justice Center 
v. City of San Antonio involved a public campaign protesting the City of 
San Antonio’s funding of a community arts center that produced gay 
                                                           
261. Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
262. Id. at 191, 200. 
263. Id. at 200. 
264. Id. at 202. 
265. Id. (quoting Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998)). 
266. Id. 
267. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 569). 
268. Id. 
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and lesbian-oriented programming.269  Under public pressure, the San 
Antonio City Council voted to eliminate the city’s funding of the arts 
center.270  Known as the Esperanza Peace and Justice Center 
(“Esperanza”), the center offered a wide variety of programming and 
provided assistance and workspace to various local artists and 
organizations.271  The city funded Esperanza from 1990 to 1997 through 
a program that provided assistance to various arts organizations.272  As 
part of that program, the city encouraged participants to merge art with 
social issues.273  
During 1997 and 1998, as the city council focused on its yearly 
budgets, lobbyists sought to eliminate Esperanza’s funding due to its 
“perceived advocacy of the ‘gay and lesbian lifestyle.’”274  Lobbyists 
also targeted the San Antonio Lesbian & Gay Media Project (“Media 
Project”), which, together with Esperanza, co-sponsored “Out at the 
Movies,” an annual lesbian and gay film festival.275  Adam McManus, a 
Christian talk-radio host who took a prominent role in the campaign 
against Esperanza, interviewed several city council members on his 
show.276  McManus, his listeners, and his interviewees displayed 
negative attitudes towards Esperanza and its funding, mainly due to 
Esperanza’s support of the “Out at the Movies” festival.277   
The Christian Pro-Life Foundation also took part in the campaign 
against Esperanza, sending flyers—singling out Esperanza by name and 
calling for opposition to city funding of similar programs—to 1,200 of 
                                                           
269. Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D. 
Tex. 2001). 
270. Id. at 440–44. 
271. Id. at 436–37. 
272. Id. at 439. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 440, 443–44. 
275. Id. at 437, 440. 
276. Id. at 440–41 (citation omitted). 
277. Id. (citation omitted). 
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its supporters, including city council members.278  Council members 
also received various communications opposing funding of Esperanza, 
largely due to Esperanza’s promotion of the “homosexual agenda.”279  
Aside from these communications, “[t]he majority of the eleven council 
members had no personal knowledge regarding Esperanza or its 
programming beyond what they were told by constituents or gathered 
from news reports.”280 
In 1997, the San Antonio Department of Art and Cultural Affairs 
(“DACA”) recommended funding for Esperanza and Media Project, but 
the city council nevertheless eliminated both groups’ funding.281  The 
city also cut funding to a third organization affiliated with Esperanza.282  
This was the first time the city had entirely eliminated funding to an 
organization for which DACA had recommended funds 
appropriation.283  In 1998, the city again denied Esperanza and Media 
Project’s funding requests.284  Esperanza and Media Project challenged 
the city’s funding denials as “viewpoint discrimination in violation of 
their free speech rights under the First Amendment,” and a “violation of 
their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.”285  
The district court began its analysis by articulating a “fundamental 
First Amendment principle—that government may not proscribe speech 
or expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed.”286  
The court pointed to Finley where “the Supreme Court made clear that 
the First Amendment forbids ‘invidious viewpoint discrimination’ in the 
                                                           
278. Id. (citation omitted). 
279. Id. (citation omitted). 
280. Id. at 441 (citations omitted). 
281. Id. at 442. 
282. Id. at 438–39 (explaining that the 1997 budget also eliminated funding for VA̅N, an 
organization whose purpose was to “bring[] national and international artists who are visiting or 
working in other parts of Texas to San Antonio for programs and networking,” and that 
Esperanza had acted as a sponsor and fiscal agent for VA̅N in its grant applications with the city). 
283. Id. at 442. 
284. Id. at 443–44. 
285. Id. at 436.  VA̅N also joined the challenge.  Id. at 433. 
286. Id. at 444 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943)). 
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arts subsidy context” and that “‘[e]ven in the provision of subsidies, the 
government may not aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”287  
Turning to the case before it, the court observed that “[t]he clearest 
example of viewpoint discrimination is that alleged here:  the denial of 
government funding because the applicant espouses an unpopular, 
controversial, or uncommon viewpoint.”288  The court held that the 
city’s “decision to refuse all funding to an applicant because of 
disapproval of one program or presentation [was] a form of viewpoint 
discrimination.”289  
San Antonio attempted to justify its decision to deny funding on 
grounds that Esperanza was either a political organization or simply 
“too political,” arguing that “arts funds should be reserved for arts 
groups, not political groups.”290  The court rejected this argument:  “We 
should be most vigilant whenever a government official undertakes to 
restrict speech because it is too ‘political.’  Labeling expression as 
‘political’ can often serve as proxy for suppression of unfavored 
ideas.”291  Applying that vigilance, the court found the city’s argument 
to be a pretext, observing that Esperanza’s political nature had never 
before been a factor in all the years the city had provided it funding.292  
Besides, the court observed, one of the grant program’s goals was to 
support programs addressing social and political concerns.293 
                                                           
287. Id. at 446 (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 586). 
288. Id. at 447 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
829 (1995) (defining “viewpoint” as “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or 
perspective of the speaker”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 393 (1993) (finding viewpoint discrimination where school “permitted school property to be 
used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing 
with the subject matter from a religious standpoint”); R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
384 (1992) (holding that the government may not “proscribe only libel critical of the 
government”)). 
289. Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (citing Brooklyn Inst. of 
Arts, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 184); Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp. 
1121, 1129 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
290. Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 456. 
291. Id. 
292. See id. at 458, 465. 
293. Id. at 457–58 (citations omitted). 
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As another justification, the city pointed to its constituents’ 
opposition to the funding of “groups ‘advocating a gay and lesbian 
lifestyle,’”294 and its council’s “right and . . . obligation to listen to 
constituent opinion in making arts funding decisions.”295  While the 
court acknowledged this to be “true,” it noted that the city’s “voters 
cannot require the council to deny funding to an arts group merely 
because that group promotes a social or political viewpoint those voters 
find objectionable.”296  Pointing to certain council members’ public 
statements about Esperanza’s gay-themed programming and the 
decision to defund it, the court found that seven out of eleven council 
members were motivated, at least in part, “to defund Esperanza because 
of its constitutionally-protected conduct.”297  With the city unable “to 
show that it would have made the same decision absent [Esperanza’s 
and Media Project’s] viewpoints,”298 the court determined that 
Esperanza was defunded “because of [their] constitutionally-protected 
expressions of viewpoint.”299  The court therefore held that the city 
engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination in contravention of 
the First Amendment.300  It concluded: 
The public funding of art remains within the complete discretion of 
the city council. . . .  Once a governing body chooses to fund art, 
however, the Constitution requires that it be funded in a viewpoint-
neutral manner, that is, without discriminating among recipients on 
the basis of their ideology. . . .  It should be remembered, however, 
that First Amendment principles also protect the right of those 
                                                           
294. Id. at 454 (citations omitted). 
295. Id. at 455 (citation omitted). 
296. Id. (citation omitted). 
297. Id. at 441, 461. 
298. Id. at 461. 
299. Id. at 463.  Additionally, the court found that “the evidence in [the] case [did not] 
support a conclusion that the council would have defunded the plaintiffs in the absence of 
Esperanza’s expressions of viewpoint,” and that, to the contrary, “the overwhelming evidence 
suggest[ed] that absent the constitutionally protected conduct, most city council members would 
never have heard of Esperanza.”  Id. at 462. 
300. Id. at 479. 
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citizens who oppose funding for the plaintiffs to freely make their 
own views known.301 
In both Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza, the government 
terminated, or sought to terminate, funding for arts organizations 
because of its objections to their exhibits or programming.302  In both 
cases, it was clear that the government’s objections to the organization’s 
speech was the root of its decision to terminate funding.303  
Additionally, the government had initially provided the funding and 
only terminated (or sought to terminate) the funding once it discovered 
that the organization’s speech was objectionable.304  This is similar to 
the facts of the Machete case, discussed infra, where the Texas Film 
Commission approved the preliminary grant application for the film but 
subsequently withdrew its approval after film’s content caused 
controversy.  That case is discussed next. 
X. MACHETE AND MACHETE KILLS 
A. The Texas Film Commission Kills Funding for Machete 
As previously discussed, Chop Shop, the production company 
responsible for Machete, applied for and received initial grant approval 
for the film from the Texas Film Commission.305  When the 
Commission notified Chop Shop of its initial approval, it also notified it 
that the initial approval “‘pertain[ed] only to the qualification of the 
application’ and that ‘[i]f the final content is determined to be in 
violation of the rules and regulations of the incentive program, the 
project [would] not be eligible to receive funds’ from the Program.”306  
                                                           
301. Id. 
302. See id. at 461–63; Brooklyn Inst. of Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
303. See Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 459–63; Brooklyn Inst. of 
Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
304. See Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 459–63; Brooklyn Inst. of 
Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
305. Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015). 
306. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. v. Tex. Film Comm’n, 483 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2016). 
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The Commission also informed Chop Shop “that ‘approval of an 
incentive application does not guarantee payment of incentive 
funds.’”307   
After Chop Shop released a trailer for the film referencing a 
divisive Arizona anti-immigration law, viewers criticized the film for 
promoting a race war.308  This controversy led to public pressure on the 
Texas Film Commission to withdraw its support for the film.309  
Following the film’s release in September 2010, Chop Shop provided 
the Commission with its final documentation, including the film’s final 
script, as required by the Incentive Program guidelines.310  The 
Commission subsequently informed Chop Shop that “‘[b]ased on the 
final review of content, the feature Machete does not qualify for a grant 
from the Texas Moving Image Industry Incentive Program.’”311  As the 
basis for its denial, the Commission cited Texas Government Code 
section 485.022(e), “which provides that the Commission ‘may deny an 
application because of inappropriate content or content that portrays 
Texas or Texans in a negative fashion, as determined by the 
[Commission].’”312 
Chop Shop challenged the denial in court (“Machete I”).313  It 
contended that once the Commission approved its initial application—in 
essence “verif[ying] that ‘the [film’s] content is in compliance with the 
rules and regulations governing the application process’”—the 
Commission could not then deny Chop Shop an Incentive Program 
grant unless “‘substantial changes’” had occurred during production of 
the film to include “‘inappropriate content or content that portrays 
                                                           
307. Id. 
308. Richard Whittaker, Is that a Wrap for Incentives?, AUSTIN CHRONICLE (Jan. 28, 
2011), https://www.austinchronicle.com/screens/2011-01-28/is-that-a-wrap-for-incentives 
[https://perma.cc/3D4B-5RQP]. 
 309. Machete Prods., L.L.C, 809 F.3d at 286. 
310. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., 483 S.W.3d at 276–77. 
311. Id. at 277. 
312. Id. (specifying that the determination be made by the Music, Film, Television, and 
Multimedia Office, which, in turn, assigned the Incentive Program’s administration to the Film 
Commission). 
313. See id. at 279. 
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Texas or Texans in a negative fashion.’”314  This was not the case here, 
as the Machete script’s final version did not materially differ from the 
original submission.315  Chop Shop argued that without such changes, 
the Commission was bound by its initial determination that Chop Shop 
qualified for the Incentive Program grant.316  
The court’s analysis focused on the construction of the statute and 
regulations that created the Incentive Program and detailed the manner 
of its operation.317  It found that the statute’s requirement that the 
Commission conduct a final script review before awarding any grant 
cannot be read to create a “standard” for either awarding or denying 
a grant application.  The statute does not direct the Commission to 
take any particular action based on its final content review.  It does 
not require that a grant be awarded if no substantial changes 
occurred during production, nor does it require that the 
Commission deny a grant if substantial changes occurred during 
production that caused the film to include content that portrays 
Texas or Texans in a negative fashion.  The decision to award or 
deny a grant remains within the Commission’s discretion.  Indeed, 
the only constraint on the Commission’s authority is the mandate 
that “the [Commission] shall consider general standards of decency 
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the citizens of 
Texas” when determining whether to act on or deny a grant 
application.318 
The court also noted that the Texas legislature “undoubtedly 
intended to provide the Commission with discretion throughout the 
entire grant approval process.”319  It based this conclusion on the fact 
that the statute “specified that the Commission ‘is not required to act on 
any grant application and may deny an application because of 
inappropriate content or content that portrays Texas or Texans in a 
                                                           
314. Id. (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e)–(f) (West 2017)).  
315. Id. 
316. Id. 
317. See id. at 282–83. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 283. 
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negative fashion.’”320  Thus, the Commission’s “denial of Machete’s 
grant application, even post-production, was authorized by the statute” 
and “not beyond its statutory authority.”321  To the court, the 
Commission was therefore free to deny Chop Shop’s application at any 
point in the application process, even if it had previously determined 
that the application qualified for a grant.322 Because Machete I did not 
raise a First Amendment challenge to the Commission’s application 
denial, the court did not address the issue.  The decision therefore 
provided little guidance regarding First Amendment protection for state 
film incentive programs.  
Nevertheless, Machete I is distinguishable from Brooklyn Institute 
and Esperanza.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Brooklyn Institute and 
Esperanza, the plaintiff in Machete I did not receive government 
funding.323  In fact, the plaintiff was not even guaranteed any funds; it 
was merely notified that its preliminary application was approved.324  
Moreover, unlike the funding denial in Brooklyn Institute and 
Esperanza, the grant denial in Machete I was pursuant to a Texas statute 
that gave the government discretionary power.325  That statute, similar 
to the standard in Finley, required the Commission to consider certain 
factors, including inappropriate content or content portraying Texas or 
Texans in a negative way, but did not require that incentives be denied 
to films containing such content.326  Finally, unlike Brooklyn Institute 
and Esperanza, Machete I did not note any Texas government officials’ 
public criticism of the film’s content.  Protests by members of the public 
would not raise First Amendment issues.327 
                                                           
320. Id. (citing GOV’T § 485.022(e)) (explaining that “the absence of an applicant’s right 
to judicial review of the Commission’s decision on a grant application confirms the Legislature’s 
intent to delegate broad discretion to the Commission to determine which projects will receive 
Program grant funds”). 
321. Id. at 282–83. 
322. Id. at 283. 
323. Id. at 276. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 278. 
326. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998). 
327. First Amendment issues are only raised when the government is objecting to or 
restricting speech.  See Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 
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Machete opened nationwide on September 3, 2010 in 2,670 
theaters, earning $11.4 million during its opening weekend (on an 
estimated $10.5 million budget).328  It was that weekend’s second-
highest grossing film, just below the George Clooney-starring film, The 
American.329  During 2010, Machete grossed over $26.5 million in the 
U.S. alone,330 making it the 100th largest domestic-grossing film that 
year.331  The film’s success lead to a Machete sequel, Machete Kills.332 
B. Funding for Machete Kills Meets the Same Fate as Machete 
Production of Machete Kills began in Texas in 2012.333  Despite 
the Commission’s denial of the original film’s application, Machete 
Productions sought an Incentive Program grant for the sequel.334  Before 
submitting its application, however, Machete Productions was informed 
that “the film would never receive an Incentive Program grant due to 
the perceived political nature and content of the film.”335  Undeterred, 
Machete Productions filed an application.336  True to form, the 
Commission denied the application due to “inappropriate content.”337  
                                                           
(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he First Amendment protects the press from 
governmental interference”). 
328. Weekend Box Office Results for September 3–5, 2010, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.box 
officemojo.com/weekend/chart/?view=&yr=2010&wknd=36&p=.htm [http://perma.cc/8C5T-
2FB9]. 
329. Id. 
330. Machete (2010), IMDB http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0985694/ [https://perma.cc/EYT9- 
FSBU]. 
331. 2010 Yearly Box Office Results, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/ 
yearly/chart/?yr=2010&p=.htm [http://perma.cc/SUA9-5KDK]. 
332. Machete Prods., L.L.C, 809 F.3d at 286. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
335. Id.  
336. Id.  
337. Id.  
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However, the Commission failed to explain what content was 
inappropriate.338   
Machete Productions filed suit challenging the denial (“Machete 
II”).339  It alleged that the Commission “applied the Incentive Program 
to it in a way that discriminated against it on the basis of viewpoint, thus 
violating its First Amendment rights.”340  Machete Productions 
contended that “[t]he real reason for the Commission’s denial [was] that 
the Commission was concerned with the political fallout from providing 
public money to a film perceived as glorifying the role of a Mexican 
Federale (Mexican Federal Police Officer) and sympathizing with 
immigrants.”341 
Addressing Machete Productions’ viewpoint-discrimination claim, 
the court cited Rust for the proposition that the government may 
“‘selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to 
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative 
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.’”342  
Thus, the court explained, there is no viewpoint discrimination, just the 
government’s choice “‘to fund one activity at the exclusion of the 
other.’”343  Such a government funding provision, the court continued, 
does not violate the First Amendment “as long as it ‘[does] not silence 
speakers by expressly threaten[ing] censorship of ideas,’ or ‘introduce 
considerations that, in practice, would effectively preclude or punish the 
expression of particular views.’”344   
Acknowledging that First Amendment protections apply to subsidy 
grants, the court observed that the government—here, the Texas Film 
                                                           
338. Id.; Muriel Perkins, ‘Machete Kills’ Producer Sues Texas Officials, COURTHOUSE 
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.courthousenews.com/machete-kills-producer-sues-
texas-officials/ [http://perma.cc/E7JR-KYTX]. 
339. Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 286. 
340. Id. 
341. Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 2, Machete Prods. L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 289 
(5th Cir. 2015) (No. D-1-GN-14-000744).  
342. Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 289 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
193 (1991)). 
343. Id. (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193). 
344. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 583).  
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Commission—”‘may allocate competitive funding according to criteria 
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a 
criminal penalty [at] stake.’”345  Nevertheless, the court cautioned, 
“[g]overnment funding provisions can become unconstitutional 
conditions if they ‘effectively prohibit the recipient from engaging in 
the protected conduct outside the scope of the [government] funded 
program,’ or if the subsidy is ‘manipulated to have a coercive 
effect.’”346  
Applying these principles to the case before it, the court concluded 
that the grant denial did not “‘effectively preclude or punish’ Machete 
[Productions] from or for holding particular viewpoints in Machete 
Kills.”347  Likewise, the court held, the denial did not effectively 
prohibit Machete Productions from producing the film.348  After all, it 
reasoned, “[d]espite the denial of an Incentive Program grant, Machete 
Kills was still filmed in Texas, produced, and released.”349  The court 
therefore rejected Machete Productions’ contention that “the First 
Amendment requires a state which has an incentive program like this 
one to fund films casting the state in a negative light.”350  In other 
words, the court held that because Machete Productions remained free 
to produce its film outside the Incentive Program’s context, the 
Commission acted lawfully within its discretion by denying funding for 
the film. 
Machete Productions also attacked the “vagueness” of the 
standards used to award and deny grants.351  In its explanation for 
rejecting the vagueness claim, the court noted that the “Due Process 
Clause does protect speakers ‘from arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement of vague standards,’ but ‘when the [g]overnment is acting 
as a patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision 
                                                           
345. Id. at 290 (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88). 
346. Id. (first quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 197; and then quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 587). 
347. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 583). 
348. Id. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). 
351. Id. at 291. 
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are not constitutionally severe.’”352  In the present case, the court 
observed, “the Incentive Program’s funding criteria are not any more 
imprecise than the criteria found to pass constitutional muster in 
Finley.”353 
Accordingly, the court held that the Commission’s denial of 
Machete Productions’ grant application did not violate the company’s 
First Amendment rights.354  In other words, the Machete II court relied 
on Rust and Finley to allow the Commission to deny Machete 
Productions’ grant application because of the film’s content,355 
reasoning that Machete Productions was free to, and did, make the film 
despite its application’s denial.356   
XI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Can states refuse to provide film incentive program funding for 
films whose content the state finds objectionable because, for example, 
the content is “inappropriate” or portrays the state or its residents in a 
negative way?  As the foregoing analysis indicates, the answer is likely 
“yes.”  This is largely due to the wide latitude courts give the 
government to designate subsidies’ purposes357 (provided they are not 
designed to encourage viewpoint diversity),358 as well as courts’ 
sanctioning of the use of criteria in granting those subsidies that would 
be impermissible in a speech-regulation context.359  So long as the 
funding denial does not “effectively prohibit” the filmmaker from 
making the film outside the incentive program’s scope, the denial is 
                                                           
352. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 588–89). 
353. Id. (observing that “[b]oth provisions require that the relevant agency consider the 
‘general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values’ of citizens.,” and that 
“[t]he Incentive Program’s statute . . . adds that the Commission may also deny an application 
due to ‘inappropriate content or content that portrays Texas or Texans in a negative fashion’”). 
354. Id.  
355. Id. at 289. 
356. Id. at 290–92. 
357. See supra Part VI. 
358. See supra Part VI. 
359. See supra Part VI. 
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likely within the state’s authority and not a violation of the applicant’s 
First Amendment rights.360 
The decisions in Rosenberger and Finley indicate that film 
incentive programs likely do not constitute a public forum, as the 
programs are not intended “to encourage a diversity of views from 
private speakers.”361  Instead, film incentive programs’ typical purpose 
is to encourage economic activity within a state.362  The economic 
benefit derives not only from the film production, but also from the 
increased tourism likely to result from a production painting the state 
favorably.363  A film’s content is therefore relevant to a state’s decision 
to support productions that best achieve these results.  And because film 
incentive programs likely do not constitute public forums,364 viewpoint-
discrimination prohibitions do not apply here.365  This does not mean 
that courts will uphold any type of government discrimination.  If the 
incentive awards are designed to have a coercive effect or are aimed at 
the suppression of unpopular ideas, then courts will likely find those 
government actions unconstitutional.366  However, laws and regulations 
allowing states to consider a film’s content, rather than prohibiting 
certain types of content, will likely be found constitutional.367  
The Texas statute, for example, provides that the Texas Film 
Commission “may deny an application because of [a film’s] 
inappropriate content or content that portrays Texas or Texans in a 
negative fashion, as determined by the [Commission].”368  It further 
provides that, “[i]n determining whether to act on or deny a grant 
                                                           
360. See supra Part VII. 
361. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). 
362. See supra Part III. 
363. See supra Part III. 
364. See supra Part VI. 
365. See supra Part VI. 
366. See supra Part VIII. 
367. However, if those laws or regulations are applied in a coercive or suppressive 
manner, an affected filmmaker may be able to mount a successful First Amendment challenge in 
court. See supra Part VIII. 
368. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e) (West 2017).  
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application, the [Commission] shall consider general standards of 
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the citizens of 
Texas.”369  The first part of this provision—dealing with inappropriate 
content or negative portrayals of Texas or Texans370—seems consistent 
with the program’s purpose to attract economic activity and tourism to 
the state.  Thus, as the Machete II court held, it is permissible under 
Rust.371   
The second part—dealing with “decency and respect for the 
diverse beliefs and values of the citizens of Texas”372—is, with the 
exception of its focus on Texas residents, the same language that was 
upheld in Finley.373  Furthermore, as in Finley, these provisions are not 
written as prohibitions.  Instead, the Commission “may” deny an 
application because of inappropriate content or negative portrayals of 
Texas or Texans.374  The Commission is not required to deny 
applications for productions that contain these types of content.375  In 
fact, the Commission may provide funding to such productions.376  The 
same is true of the second half of the provision, which simply requires 
the Commission to consider the values of decency and respect.377  The 
Commission may still fund productions it finds indecent or 
disrespectful.378  As the court observed in Machete I, Texas law gives 
the Commission great discretion to approve or deny applications and 
even permits the Commission to take no action at all.379 
                                                           
369. Id.  
370. Id. 
371. See supra Part X. 
372. GOV’T § 485.022(e). 
373. See supra Part VI. 
374. GOV’T § 485.022(e). 
375. See id. 
376. See id. 
377. See id. 
378. See id. 
379. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. v. Tex. Film Comm’n, 483 S.W.3d 272, 281, 283–84 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (citing GOV’T § 485.022(e)). 
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Indeed, the Texas film incentive program provisions were 
challenged and upheld in Machete I and Machete II (collectively, 
“Machete Cases”), even though the government funding-denials 
appeared to be, at least in part, a result of the states’ objection to the 
films’ content.380  These cases had key differences from Brooklyn 
Institute and Esperanza, where First Amendment violations were 
found.381  In both Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza, the government 
was already providing funding to the arts organizations and 
subsequently terminated (or sought to terminate) that funding when it 
learned the organizations were displaying “offensive” art.382  In the 
Machete Cases, however, the Texas Film Commission had yet to 
distribute any funds when it made its determination.383   
As a result, the Machete Cases determined that the Texas Film 
Commission has great discretionary authority to approve or deny 
applications.384  And relying heavily on Rust, Machete II also 
determined that the government did not violate the filmmaker’s First 
Amendment rights, provided the incentives-denial did not effectively 
prevent the filmmaker from making the film, which it did not.385  These 
cases suggest that, in denying a film funding based on its content, the 
government may have more leeway before it issues the funding than 
after it has already done so. 
Another significant difference between these cases is the 
governments’ reasons for refusals or withdrawals of funding.  In both 
Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza, government officials made numerous 
public statements expressing their objection to the speech the recipients 
                                                           
380. See generally Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2015); 
Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., 483 S.W.3d at 272. 
381. See generally Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 
2d 433 (W.D. Tex. 2001); Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 
184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
382. See Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 459–63; Brooklyn Inst. of 
Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
383. See generally Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 281; Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., 
483 S.W.3d at 272. 
384. See generally Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 281; Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., 
483 S.W.3d at 272. 
385. See generally Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 281. 
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provided, allowing courts to easily connect those objections with the 
decisions to deny funding.386  These kinds of statements by government 
officials were lacking in the Machete Cases:  While there was a 
significant public outcry against the first Machete film, government 
officials were much more restrained about expressing any objections 
they might have had to the film’s content than were the officials in 
Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza.  The Texas Film Commission 
provided the Machete films’ producers little reason for their 
applications’ rejection, other than the cursory explanation that the films 
contained inappropriate content and/or depicted the state or its residents 
in a negative light.387  This language is found in the statute itself, and for 
reasons discussed above, does not violate the First Amendment on its 
face.   
Some commentators have suggested that the Court’s holding in 
Finley—the case most relevant here because of its standards’ similarity 
to the Texas film incentive program’s provisions—presents disturbing 
implications.  Karen M. Kowalski observed: 
The majority opinion [in Finley] . . . took the stance that the 
decency [and respect] clause was constitutional because it was 
advisory and not a direct restriction on the content or viewpoint of 
the artistic expression.  There are arguably two effects on First 
Amendment doctrine because of the new “advisory language” 
category for government regulation of expression.  First, the 
Court’s conclusion that the clause is constitutional because it is 
“advisory” encourages the deceptive drafting of future legislation.  
The Court sends the message to future legislators that the 
constitutionality of any legislation will depend not on what type of 
expression they seek to prohibit, but rather whether they include 
enough prepositions.  If by including certain jargon, the legislation 
can be read to consider factors rather than require the presence of 
certain factors, the legislation will be constitutional.  . . .  [W]hether 
legislation is phrased to consider or require the consideration of 
certain values is inconsequential because the decision maker will 
                                                           
386. See generally Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 433; Brooklyn 
Inst. of Arts, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 184. 
387. See supra Part X. 
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regard the factors as a mandate from Congress rather than merely a 
helpful hint.388 
Harold B. Walther also found the holding in Finley “problematic 
because by holding that only those acts of Congress that expressly 
threaten the censorship of ideas will be deemed unconstitutional, the 
Court implicitly afforded Congress the power to discriminate against an 
individual group or an individual viewpoint.”389  As Walther sees it, 
Finley gives “Congress a ‘violate the First Amendment free’ card, 
provided that Congress is inventive enough to reach their desired ends 
implicitly, rather than expressly.”390 
It is true, the Finley opinion provides legislatures with guidance on 
how to avoid funding disfavored content without violating the First 
Amendment.  For example, Congress may indirectly prohibit funding to 
disfavored content by requiring the decisionmaker to consider such 
content rather than directly prohibiting the funding of that content.  The 
Texas Legislature used this approach when it created the Texas Film 
Incentive Program, as its content provisions are only considerations for 
the Commission, not actual prohibitions,391 and the language used in the 
statute closely follows that of the provision upheld in Finley.392 
The Machete Cases may also guide government officials on how to 
avoid funding objectionable artistic speech without violating the First 
Amendment.  A significant problem for the government in both 
Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza was that government officials made 
their motivations clear.393  As Sarah F. Warren observed:  
                                                           
388. Karen M. Kowalski, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley:  Painting a Grim 
Picture for Federally-Funded Art, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 217, 268 (1999) (citations omitted). 
389. Harold B. Walther, Note, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley:  Sinking 
Deeper into the Abyss of the Supreme Court’s Unintelligible Modern Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine, 59 MD. L. REV. 225, 250 (2000). 
390. Id. 
391. GOV’T §485.002(e). 
392. See supra Part VI. 
393. Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 459–61; Brooklyn Inst. of Arts, 
64 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
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The difficulty with Esperanza [arose] only because the City 
Council was not savvy enough to deny funding to the Esperanza 
Center without admitting that they were doing so based on the 
particular views expressed.  In fact, the City did little to conceal its 
motives behind the budget cut.  Indeed, they were quite honest 
about their dislike for the Esperanza Center’s views.394   
On the other hand, in the Machete Cases, it appears the 
government did little more than cite the statute as the reason for its 
funding denial.395  It did not add their voices to the public campaign 
against the first Machete film, considered objectionable by members of 
the public.396  And while it is possible that this restraint helped the 
Texas Film Commission’s case, it certainly did not hurt it.   
These lessons, while potentially instructive for legislators and 
other government officials, likely give little comfort to filmmakers.  As 
discussed above, courts allow the government wide latitude to deny 
subsidies, even permitting it to use criteria in the subsidy context that 
would clearly be forbidden in a regulatory context.397  Moreover, 
proving prohibited discrimination in these contexts is near impossible, 
as the Supreme Court has recognized: 
When the limited spending program does not create a public 
forum, proving coercion is virtually impossible, because simply denying 
a subsidy “does not ‘coerce’ belief,” and because the criterion of 
unconstitutionality is whether denial of the subsidy threatens “to drive 
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”  Absent such a 
threat, “the Government may allocate . . . funding according to criteria 
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a 
criminal penalty at stake.”398 
Finley seems to grant legislators even more latitude to craft 
subsidy programs to include otherwise impermissible criteria, provided 
                                                           
394. See Sarah F. Warren, Note, Art:  To Fund or Not to Fund?  That Is Still the 
Question, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 171 (2001) (citations omitted). 
395. See supra Part X. 
396. See supra Part X. 
397. See supra Part VI. 
398. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552-53 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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those criteria are mere considerations rather than outright 
prohibitions.399  Furthermore, the denial of a subsidy only eliminates a 
potential source of funding for filmmakers, leaving filmmakers in no 
worse a position than before applying for the subsidy.  The key factor 
for the government, in avoiding the application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, is that filmmakers remain free to produce their 
films with objectionable content outside the incentive program.  Using 
Texas as an example—although this observation applies to other states’ 
incentive programs as well—while filmmakers are free to make films 
that portray Texas negatively, they are not entitled to have Texas pay 
for those films. 
                                                           
399. See supra Part VI. 
